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11. Introduction
  The  policy  instruments  that  are  regularly  considered  in  the  literature  on  the
economics of patents include the required inventive step and the duration of a patent,
and its lagging breadth and leading breadth. Here lagging breadth refers to the
minimum quality difference that the patented product must have with a lower-quality
product if the latter may be produced without infringing on the patent, and similarly,
leading breadth is the quality improvement which a superior product must at least
have if it does not infringe on the patent (Cf. O’Donoghue et. al., 1998, p. 3). Until
recently, economists have considered the problem of the optimal choice of these
instruments mostly within a partial equilibrium framework.  On the other hand,
endogenous growth theory studies the incentives to conduct research and development
within a general equilibrium framework. This makes it possible not just to explicitly
discuss the effects of intellectual property rights on growth rate, but also to consider
some aspects of IPR protection that do not have any obvious representation in a
partial equilibrium model.1
  However, the large majority of the endogenous growth models that have been put
forward until now postulate that a research firm which invents a new, improved
design for a product receives a permanent monopoly for producing it. This
corresponds to patents which have an infinite duration, and in which both the required
inventive step and the leading breadth are smaller than the quality improvement in any
of the innovations that are actually made.
  As Figure 1 illustrates, the model of endogenous growth theory can broadly speaking
be divided into the models of growth through specialization, in which each newly
invented design of a product increases the number of the different products on the
market, and Schumpeterian models of growth through creative destruction in which
each newly invented design of a product replaces an existing design. A model of
growth through specialization provides a natural framework for analyzing the effects
of the expected length of the monopoly on economic growth, and an interesting
1 E.g., the discussion of the allocation of R&D resources between the different sectors of the economy
in O’Donoghue and Zweimüller (2004, pp. 103-108) does not have any obvious counterpart in a
partial-equilibrium framework. Similarly, in the model of Horii and Iwaisako (2007) stronger
intellectual property rights reduce the real wage in the production sector by increasing the number of
the monopolist sectors of the economy, which makes working in research more attractive in
comparison  with  working  in  production  (see  p.  79),  an  effect  which  would  be  hard  to  analyze  in  a
partial equilibrium framework.
2analysis of this kind has recently been provided in Furukawa (2007).2 However, since
in a model of growth through specialization all new designs correspond to products of
a completely new kind (rather than improvements in some already existing product),
the growth effects of the required inventive step and the breadth of patents cannot be
addressed in their context.
Figure 1. Endogenous Growth Models with Perfect and Imperfect Intellectual
Property Rights.
2 Furukawa (2007) shows that in the context of his model the long-run rate of innovation has an
inverse-U shape as a function of the rate of imitation, and argues on the basis of this finding that too
strong intellectual property protection is not growth-promoting.
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3  The models of growth through creative destruction can be classified into the single-
sector and multi-sector models on the basis of the number of the different designs that
the products on the market have at each moment of time.  The multi-sector models of
growth through creative destruction, which constitute a natural framework for
studying the effects of breadth and the required inventive step, can further be divided
into two groups on the basis of the nature of the quality improvement that
distinguishes  the  newly  designed  product  from  the  one  that  it  replaces.  More
specifically, in a quality ladder model,  such  as  the  one  that  is  put  forward  in
Grossman and Helpman (1991), each innovation constitutes a quality improvement of
a fixed size relative to the previous product of the same sector (ibid., p. 45), whereas
in a “leapfrogging” model each improved product receives the quality which
corresponds to the current leading-edge technology (see Aghion and Howitt, 1996,
1997, and 1998, pp. 85-121). The latter assumption is motivated by the idea that the
innovators make use of a shared pool of technological knowledge, which is
represented by the quality of the newest designs of products on the market.
  Time is continuous and the emergence of innovations is a Poisson process in the
model of Grossman and Helpman (1991), and this easily implies that in a Nash
equilibrium the expected returns from R&D are identical in all the sectors in which
there is R&D.3  It  is  easy  to  see  that  a  model  of  this  type  can  have  a  sensible
equilibrium only if the profit that a patent to the currently used design of a product
yields to its owner is independent of the quality of the product.4 Accordingly,
Grossman and Helpman (1991, p. 45) choose the utility function of the consumers in
such a way that this rather implausible assumption becomes valid.  The recent,
interesting papers O’Donoghue and Zweimüller (2004) and Horii and Iwaisako (2007)
discuss multi-sector quality ladder models with imperfect intellectual property rights,5
and just like in the model of Grossman and Helpman (1991), in these models a quality
3 This is because the probability that two firms would make an innovation in the same sector at the
same moment of time is infinitesimal, so that each research firm can at each moment of time choose
where to put its research resources independently of the choices of the other firms. For this reason each
firm can have an incentive to do research only in a sector in which the returns to it are maximal.
4 If the profit from the monopoly to a product was an increasing function of its quality, in a continuous-
time quality ladder model all research firms would choose to try improve the highest-quality product
only, and the lower-quality products would permanently maintain their low quality.
5 O’Donoghue and Zweimüller (2004) consider the optimization of the patentability requirement and
the leading breadth when these are allowed to differ, and Horii and Iwaisako (2007) put forward a
model in which the holder of a patent loses its monopoly with an exogenously given probability in
each period.
4improvement in a product does not increase its demand, which implies that an owner
of a patent cannot increase her profits by making improvements to the product.6
  Below I shall put forward a shared pool of knowledge model of growth through
creative destruction, in which the demand of each product is an increasing function of
its quality, and which provides tools for analyzing the effects of patent policy on
economic growth. The adjustable parameters of the model include the patentability
requirement (i.e. the required inventive step) and the imitation rate. Similarly with
Horii and Iwaisako (2007) and Furukawa (2007), the imitation rate is in the current
model the parameter of a Poisson process, which represents the loss of intellectual
property rights through imitation.
  This way of representing the fact that intellectual property rights have a finite
duration can be contrasted with a representation in which the monopoly for a new
product last always for a time T, after which the design of the product becomes non-
proprietary and several competing firms start producing it. The practice of not
choosing the latter option is motivated by the empirical evidence which suggests that
such appropriability mechanisms as secrecy, lead time, and complementary sales and
services would in most industries be more important than patents.7  These findings are
partially explained by the fact that a patent might fail to provide the intended
temporary monopoly to its owner for several reasons.8
6 In the model of O’Donoghue and Zweimüller (2004), the innovations improve the quality of final
goods, and in it the utility function of the consumers has been chosen in such a way that, keeping
prices fixed, the demand of each good is independent of its quality (ibid., p. 85). Similarly, in the
model of Horii and Iwaisako (2007), in which the innovations are improvements in the quality of
intermediate inputs and affect the amount of a final good that results from them, the production
function has been chosen in such a way that a quality improvement does not affect the amount of each
intermediate good that the final-good producer buys in equilibrium (ibid., p. 51).
7  See Levin et al. (1987, p. 794), Mansfield (1986), and Cohen et al. (2000). Mansfield presents a
survey according to which in most industries, a large majority (more than 80%) of the commercially
introduced inventions would have been introduced even without the patent system. However, patents
were according to this survey nevertheless essentially more important within pharmaceutical and
chemical industries (ibid., p. 175). Cohen et al. (2000) contains an analysis of a survey in which R&D
unit or lab managers were asked to evaluate the effectiveness of various appropriability mechanisms in
protecting the “firm’s competitive advantage” from both product and process innovations. The
considered mechanisms were secrecy, patents, other legal methods, lead time, complementary sales
and services, and complementary manufacturing. It turned out that, on the average, patents were the
least central of these mechanisms, whereas secrecy and lead time were the two most important ones
(ibid., pp. 9-10; cf. also Figures 1-4). Levin et al. (1987) discusses a survey which has led to similar
findings (see, in particular, ibid., pp. 793-398).
8  E.g., it might be possible to “invent around” the patent, it might be uncertain whether the patent is
judged to be valid if it is challenged (cf. Levin et al., 1987, pp.  802-805), and litigation costs might be
so high that a patentee might choose not to defend the patent in court if it is violated. According to the
survey of Cohen et al. (2000), this consideration is more relevant for the innovations which have been
made by smaller firms (ibid., p. 15). Cf. also Lerner (1995).
5  I shall present the main features of the model in Section 2 below. Section 3 analyzes
the properties of the momentary equilibria of the production sector of the model, and
Section 4 discusses its balanced growth paths and more specifically, the
circumstances under which growth traps and multiple equilibria are possible. Section
5  discusses  the  optimization  of  the  policy  variables  (imitation  rate  and  patentability
requirement) of the model, and Section 6 concludes.
2. The Framework
  The earlier “pool of knowledge” growth models by Philippe Aghion and Peter
Howitt  which  are  referred  to  in  Figure  1  are  models  in  which  a  single  final  good is
produced from a continuum ? ?0,1  of intermediate goods. In these models
technological progress consists in the discovery of new, improved designs for the
intermediate goods. Aghion and Howitt assume that each intermediate good is
produced by a monopolist, the owner of the patent to its current design, and that the
monopolist can drive the previous incumbent out of the market and choose monopoly
pricing without being faced with competition with the incumbent (see e.g. Aghion and
Howitt 1996, p. 16). However, it seems that it would be quite difficult to give a
detailed account of the economic mechanism which makes the old products disappear
in the context of these models.9
  Unlike Aghion and Howitt’s earlier models, the model which is put forward below
contains also an account of the competition between the producers of a superior and
an inferior product of the same sector. This has been achieved by reinterpreting
Aghion and Howitt’s framework as describing a continuum ? ?0,1  of final goods which
are used by consumers with a utility function which  has  a  similar  form  with  the
production function of Aghion and Howitt’s model.  In the current model the
9 In the model which is considered in e.g. Aghion and Howitt (1998, pp. 86-91), the intermediate goods
are used for producing a homogenous final good, and the quality differences in the new and the old
designs  of  intermediate  goods  are  shown only  in  the  amount  of  the  final  good that  can  be  produced
from  them.  In  this  model  the  owner  of  the  patent  to  a  superior  design  can  use  monopoly  pricing
without being threatened with competition with the inferior product, although the quality difference
between the old and the new design may be arbitrarily small. These assumptions seem difficult to
justify, although – as I shall point out below – the situation of Aghion and Howitt’s model could be
viewed as a representation of an inappropriately functioning patent system, in which it is possible to
make trivial improvements to existing products and to patent their already existing features, and in this
way exclude their producers from the market.
6government has two policy instruments with which it can affect the long-run growth
rate, the rate of imitation and the required inventive step, and it is easy to see that in
the limit in which there is no imitation and no required inventive step, the
mathematical structure of the current model becomes identical with the structure of
one of the earlier models by Aghion and Howitt, despite of its different economic
interpretation.10 The structure of the current model has been depicted in Figure 2 (cf.
Figure 3.1 in Aghion and Howitt, 1998, p. 86).
Figure 2. A multi-sector Schumpeterian growth model without capital.
10 More specifically, the multisector “pool of knowledge” growth models that Aghion Howitt have put
forward in Aghion and Howitt (1996), Aghion and Howitt (1997), and Aghion and Howitt (1998, pp.
85-121), can all be viewed as variants of a basic form of their model, which they present in ibid., pp.
86-91. It is easy to verify that if one assumes that there is no imitation, all the results in Section 3
except for the analysis between the competition of an entrant and an incumbent are valid also in this
model, when the final goods are viewed as intermediate goods and the utility function (3) is interpreted
as a production function of a single, homogenous final good, for which the consumers’ utility function
is given by (4). However, under this interpretation the formula (21) is not just an arbitrary definition,
but it can be deduced by stipulating that wealth is measured in units of the final good, i.e. that the price
of one unit of the final good is 1. Hence, the current model becomes essentially identical with one of
Aghion and Howitt’s models, when one puts 0? ?  (i.e. there is no imitation)  and 1P ?  (i.e. there
is no required inventive step).
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7  There is a continuum of agents whose measure has been normalized to one and who
can work either in the production sector or in the research sector. Time is continuous,
and the amounts of labor force in production and in research at time t are denoted by
tL  and tD , respectively. The total size of the labor force has been normalized to 1 so
that the labor market clearing condition is
(1) 1t tL D? ?
  There is a continuum ? ?0,1  of final goods which the agents consume.  Each final
good i is produced using labor only in such a way that
(2) it ity l?
The instantaneous utility function of the agents is
(3)
1
0t it it
u A c di?? ?
where itA  is the quality parameter which characterizes the level of technology in
sector i at time t and itc  the consumed amount of the good i at time t. Here 0 1?? ? ,
so  that  the  utility  function  of  the  final  good  is  concave.  It  will  be  assumed  that  the
consumption of two different variants of the good of the same sector brings no extra
utility (i.e., if the consumer consumed the amounts itc?  and itc??   of two products of the
same sector i with the respective quality parameters itA?  and itA?? , this would make only
the contribution ? ?max ,it it it itA c A c? ?? ? ?? ??  to the integral in (3), so that consuming different
products of the same sector would be pointless). The total utility of each agent is
given by the utility function
(4)
0
t
tU e u dt
?? ?? ?
where the rate of time preference 0? ?  is a constant.
  Similarly with the most of the endogenous growth literature, this paper is concerned
with a model in which the utility of the agents is independent of the sector in which
they work. However, there is empirical evidence which suggests that persons with
scientific education have a preference for research, which is shown in accepting
employment  in  research  even  when  it  has  a  lower  salary  than  employment  of  other
8kinds.11 Within the current framework, the preference for research could be modeled
by postulating that the utility of an individual depends on the sector that she works in
(because of e.g. a social status associated with science), leading to a wage difference
between the two sectors.12 I  shall  shortly  consider  a  generalized  model  with  this
feature at the end of Section 4 below.
The firms of the research sector produce sector-specific innovations. An innovation
in a sector ? ?0,1i?  is a new design for the good of sector i whose quality parameter
iA  equals the current maximum value max,tA  of quality parameters, which represents
the current stock of knowledge, or a “technology frontier”. This assumption
distinguishes “pool of knowledge” growth models from the quality ladder models, and
it is motivated by the idea of a technology spillover from the other, more advanced
sectors.
  When an innovation happens in a given sector ? ?0,1i? , the product which
corresponds to the innovation becomes temporarily proprietary. This means that its
inventor receives a temporary monopoly for producing it. This monopoly can end in
one  of  two  ways:  either  another  innovation  is  made  in  the  same  sector,  or  the
considered product turns into a nonproprietary one. The latter event is governed by a
Poisson process with the hazard rate ? . As it was explained in the introduction, the
parameter ?  is a representation of the strength of intellectual property rights and other
ways of appropriating revenue for innovations, and its value can be affected by the
government.
  Innovations have also a required inventive factor P.13 The parameter P specifies the
minimum that the ratio of the quality parameter values before and after the innovation
must at least have if it leads to the desired monopoly. In other words, since the quality
parameter receives by assumption the value max,tA  after the innovation, an innovation
leads to a monopoly in the sectors i for which
(5) max,t
it
A
P
A
?
11  Cf. Stern (2004).
12  A growth model with this feature has been put forward in e.g. Fershtman et al. (1996; cf. p. 114).
13  The required inventive factor receives the value 1 in an economy in which arbitrarily small
improvements of products lead to a monopoly. The required inventive step, which is 0 when trivial
innovations lead to monopoly, could be defined in several different ways, e.g. as 1P ?  or as ln P .
However, below I shall discuss the optimal choice of P without explicitly introducing either of these
definitions.
9  There are two ways of interpreting this assumption. In the earlier models which are
due to Aghion and Howitt arbitrarily small improvements in products lead to a
monopoly of the improved product, and in a straightforward generalization of these
models (5) can be viewed simply as a representation of a patentability requirement.
Under this interpretation the social planner chooses arbitrarily a value 1patentP P? ? ,
and then grants monopoly to those and only those innovations which satisfy the
condition (5).
  However, the current model contains also an analysis of the competition between the
monopolist and the producer of the inferior products of the same sector, and this
analysis  implies  that  the  inventor  of  the  superior  product  will  be  able  to  earn
monopoly  profits  only  if  the  quality  ratio  between  the  new  and  the  old  product
exceeds a limit 0P . If it is assumed that the producer has to take into account the
competition with inferior products of the same sector, there will be no incentive for
research in the sectors for max, 0t itA A P? , and in equilibrium there will be research
only in the sector which satisfy (5) with ? ?0max ,patentP P P? .
  Nevertheless, below I shall mostly let 1P ?  be arbitrary without introducing the
restriction 0P P? ,  and  I  shall  consider  also  the  situation  of  Aghion  and  Howitt’s
model, in which arbitrarily small improvements to a product make the producer of its
inferior version disappear from the market. One way to interpret the situation in which
0P P?  is to think of it as a case in which the patent system does not function properly,
and it is possible to obtain a monopoly for a product by patenting a combination of its
already existing features and improvements to it.
  The emergence of innovations in a sector i is governed by a Poisson process with the
arrival rate
(6) it itD? ??
where itD  is the amount of research labor in sector i at time t and the constant ?  is
the efficiency parameter, which represents the efficiency of the research sector in
producing new innovations.
  Given that the expected profit from a proprietary innovation is identical in all sectors
which there is research, it will be assumed that there is the same amount of research
labor in all these sectors. This implies that the Poisson parameter given by (6) is
identical  in  all  the  sectors  in  which  there  is  research.  It  is  also  assumed  that  the
10
Poisson processes that correspond to the innovations of the different researchers and
the ones which turn proprietary innovations nonproprietary are all independent of
each other. It should be observed that when 1P ? , the value (6) is different from the
quantity
(7) t tD? ??
which expresses the average arrival rate of innovations in all sectors of economy.
  Finally, the innovations also increase the “pool of knowledge” which they utilize.
The size of this pool of knowledge is represented by the “technology frontier”, i.e. the
maximum value max,tA  of the quality parameter, and the time development of max,tA  is
determined by the equation
(8) max, max, lnt t tA A ? ???
Here the constant ln?  expresses the efficiency of the research sector in improving the
level of technology.14
3. The Production Sector
  In this section I shall deduce the properties of the momentary equilibrium of the
production sector, taking the available labor force tL  and  the  quality  parameters  of
both proprietary and non-proprietary goods as given. It will turn out to be convenient
to specify the quality parameters in terms of the quantity
(9)
max,
it
i
t
Aa
A
?
which will below be called the relative quality parameter of the sector i. Each non-
proprietary product i is produced under perfect condition, so that its price ,N tp  equals
its  production  costs.  Given  the  production  function  (2),  these  are  equal  with  the
current wage tw , so that
(10) ,N t tp w?
  The proprietary products are produced by a monopolist, i.e. their inventor. Consider
now  the  optimization  problem  of  a  monopolist  in  a  sector i,  who  chooses  the  price
14 My motive for denoting this constant by ln?  is to keep my notation similar with the one used in
Aghion – Howitt (1998; see p. 88).
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,P tp  for a proprietary product, assuming all other prices as given. A consumer who
maximizes the instantaneous utility function (3) will distribute her consumption in
such a way that the ratio of the marginal utility and the price is identical in all sectors,
i.e. in such a way that the value ? ?1jt jt jtu A c p?? ??? , where jtp  is the price of the good
j at time t, is constant for all sectors. Hence, the consumed amounts itc  and jtc  of any
two goods satisfies the condition
? ?1 1
jt it
it jt
it jt
p Ac c
p A
??? ?
? ? ?? ?? ?
This relation is valid for all consumers, so that in equilibrium also the produced
amounts of the two goods must satisfy the relation
(11)
? ?1 1
jt it
it jt
it jt
p Ay y
p A
??? ?
? ? ?? ?? ?
Now the profit of the monopolist of sector i can be expressed in the form
? ?it t itp w y? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?1 1
1 1 1 it
it it t jt jt
jt
Ap p w p y
A
?
? ? ?
?
? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?
Since the number of sectors forms a continuum, the monopolist of sector i will in
equilibrium maximize this quantity, taking not just jtp  but also jty  as given. Hence,
in equilibrium the monopolist chooses the price
(12) ,,
N tt
Pr t
pwp ? ?? ?
which is at each moment of time identical in all proprietary sectors of the economy.
   It is now possible to deduce the produced amounts of the goods from the result (11)
and their prices, which are given by (10) and (12). If ? ?,Pr ty a  and ? ?,N ty a  denote
respectively the produced amounts of proprietary and a non-proprietary good with
relative quality parameter a, (10), (11), and (12) imply that
 (13)
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
1 1 1 1
, ,
1 1
, ,
1
1
N t Pr t
Pr t Pr t
y a a y
y a a y
? ?
?
? ? ? ?
?
? ???
???
The value of ? ?, 1Pr ty  – i.e. the produced amount of a proprietary good with the
relative quality parameter 1 –  can now be deduced from the labor market clearing
condition. Since according to (2) the produced amount of each good and the amount
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of labor used for producing it are numerically identical, the labor market clearing
condition for productive labor can be formulated as
(14) ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?1 1, , , ,0 0Pr t Pr t N t N t th a y a da h a y a da L? ?? ?
Here the functions ,Pr th  and ,N th  denote the density functions that the relative quality
parameter a has at time t among the proprietary and the nonproprietary products.
  Now one can conclude from (13) and (14) that
(15) ? ? ? ?, 1 1
, ,
1 tPr t
Pr t N t
Ly ?? ? ?
?
? ? ?
where the aggregators ,Pr t?  and ,N t?  are given by
(16)
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
1 1 1
, ,0
1 1 1
, ,0
Pr t Pr t
N t N t
h a a da
h a a da
?
?
?
?
?? ???
?? ??
?
?
  Clearly, (13), (15), and (16) suffice to determine the produced amounts of both
proprietary and non-proprietary goods. It can now be concluded that the profit of the
monopolist of a sector with the relative quality parameter value a is
(17)
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
? ?
1 1
, , ,
1 1
1 1
, ,
11
1
t Pr t Pr t t Pr t t
t
t
Pr t N t
a y a p w a y w
La w
?
?
?
?? ?
?
? ?
?
?
? ?
?? ? ?
? ?? ? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ?
This result shows that profits are an increasing function of the profitability (measured
by 1 ? ), of the labor force tL  which is available in the production sector, and of the
wage level tw , and a decreasing function of the aggregators ,Pr t?  and ,N t? , which
can be thought of as measures of the quality of the competing proprietary and non-
proprietary products.
 Since the measure of the agents has been normalized to 1, the produced amounts of
the goods are numerically identical with the consumption of a representative
consumer. Hence, the instantaneous utility of the representative consumer equals
? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ? ? ?
1 1
0 0
1 1
, max, , max, ,0 0
1
max, , , ,   1
t it it it it
Pr t t Pr t N t N t
t Pr t N t Pr t
u A c di A y di
h a aA y a da h a aA y a da
A y
? ?
? ?
? ? ?? ? ?
? ? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?
? ?
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Together with (15), this implies that the utility of the representative consumer is given
by
(18)
? ?
? ?
1
, ,
max,1 1
, ,
Pr t N t
t t t
Pr t N t
u A L
? ?
?
??
?
?
? ?
? ?
? ? ??
? ?? ? ?? ?
  This analysis has been based on the assumption that each monopolist has to compete
with just products of the other sectors, but not with earlier, lower-quality products of
the  same  sector.  However,  as  it  was  explained  in  Section  2,  we  wish  to  be  able  to
discuss both a situation in which the earlier product of the same sector always
disappears when a superior product comes to the market, as it happens in Aghion and
Howitt’s original model, and a situation in which the new monopolist has to take into
account the possibility of a competition with lower-quality products.
  Turning to the analysis of this competition, it is now supposed that there are two
products of the same sector with the relative quality parameters OLDa  and NEWa  and
with the respective prices OLDp  and NEWp , where OLD NEWa a?  and N OLD NEWp p p? ? .
By assumption, there are no consumers who would have an incentive for buying both
products, so that each consumer makes a choice between buying some quantity OLDc
of the good of quality OLDa  and buying some quantity NEWc  of the good of quality
NEWa . Consider now the options of spending fixed amount of wealth W on either of
the  products.  In  this  case  the  consumed  amounts  are OLD OLDc W p?  and
NEW NEWc W p? , and according to (3) the increase in utility is in the two cases given
by ? ? ? ?max,t OLD OLDOLDu A W a p? ?? ?  and ? ? ? ?max,t NEW NEWNEWu A W a p? ?? ? ,
respectively. It is now observed that for all values of W the utility from consuming the
higher-quality product is larger than the utility from consuming the lower-quality
product if and only if
(19) OLD NEW
OLD NEW
a a
p p? ?
?
and similarly,  for all values of W the lower-quality product yields larger utility if the
converse inequality is valid. Given that this is valid for all values of W, all consumers
will choose the higher-quality product if (19) is valid. When the older (i.e. lower-
quality) product is nonproprietary so that OLD Np p? , and also when it is a proprietary
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product whose producer gets involved in a price competition which makes its price
sink to Np , the producer of the newer product will in equilibrium choose the price
1 1
min , min ,NEW t NEWNEW Pr OLD t
OLD OLD
a w ap p p w
a a
? ?
?
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
Hence, a monopolist will be able to choose the price tw ?  which would be optimal in
the absence of the inferior-quality product if and only if the quality improvement in
the product NEW OLDP a a?  is at least 0P , where
(20) 0P
?? ??
  Hence, if the inventors of new products have to compete with inferior products of the
same sector, and in equilibrium there can be research only in those sectors for which
0P P? , the value 0P  forms  an  minimum  for  the  required  inventive  step P which
appears in (5).
  Above I have not explicitly introduced any values for the wage level tw  or the prices
,Pr tp  and ,N tp  which are determined by it. In a growth model with capital, the choice
of the units of wealth at one instant of time would suffice to determine the units at all
other moments of time, but since the current model does not contain capital, and since
also the stock of the other goods varies in it constantly, in it the units of wealth must
be chosen for each moment of time separately. In what follows, I shall fix the units by
choosing the wage level to be
(21)
? ?? ?
max,2
1
, 1
t
t
Pr t
A
w
y
?? ?? ? ?
11 1max,2
, ,1
t
Pr t N t
t
A
L
??
?? ?
?? ?
?
? ?? ? ? ?? ?
at each instant of time t. The intuitive motivation for this definition can be seen by
observing that if i is a proprietary good with relative quality parameter value 1a ? , so
that max,it tA A?  and it itp w ?? , (21) implies that for the representative consumer
 (22) 1it it it it
it
dA c A c
dc
? ?? ?? 1it
it
A
y ?
?
?? ,i tp?
and the result (13) easily implies that this formula is valid for all goods i if and only if
it  is  valid  for  any  one  of  them.  A  comparison  of  (22)  and  the  definition  (3)  of  the
utility function tu  shows  that  with  the  current  choice  of  units the prices of the
products express their marginal utility for the representative consumer.
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4. The Balanced Growth Paths and Growth Traps
  In  the  current  model  it  is  natural  to  define  the  growth  rate g of the economy to be
identical with the growth rate of the “research frontier” max,tA , which is according to
(8) given by15
(23) max,
max,
lnt t
t
A
g
A
? ?? ?
?
A balanced growth path is, by definition, an equilibrium in which g has a positive
constant value. With a growth trap I shall in what follows mean an equilibrium in
which the growth rate is zero, although also an equilibrium with a positive growth rate
would be possible for identical parameter values.
  It is fairly easy to see that the current model has growth traps. This is because of the
fact that unlike in the quality ladder model, in the “pool of knowledge” model
researchers cannot freely choose the size of the quality improvement that their
research yields in a given product. Rather, the size of the improvement is determined
by the closeness of its current design to the “research frontier”. Given the idealizing
assumption that the shift of the “research frontier” that each single innovation causes
is infinitesimal, this implies that the researchers do not have an incentive to improve
on the  products  whose  quality  is  so  high  that  the  improvement  does  not  lead  to  the
desired monopoly.
  More specifically, when in the current model the required inventive factor P is larger
than 1, there are no incentives for improving on proprietary products whose quality
parameter a is larger than 1 P . This immediately implies that when 1P ? , the model
has zero-growth equilibria, i.e. equilibria with no growth and no innovations, since
there is no incentive for making innovations if all products have a relative quality
parameter which is larger than 1 P .
  The following proposition states a somewhat stronger result.
15 This definition is natural, since (18) implies that on a balanced growth path the value g expresses
also the growth rate of the utility of the representative consumer, because – as the results (26) and (27)
below show – on a balanced growth path Pr?  and N?  are constants.
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PROPOSITION 1. (a) The model has zero-growth equilibria among its Nash
equilibriums whenever the required inventive factor P is larger than 1.
(b) The considered model has zero-growth equilibria even when 1P ?  whenever
? ?
? ? ? ?1
1
1
1? ?
??
? ? ? ??
? ?? ?
  The proofs of all propositions are presented in Appendix 1.
  However, the growth traps which result when all products are close to the research
frontier can be viewed as an artifact of the modeling technique that we have chosen,
i.e. of the fact that in the model it is impossible to make large improvements to the
products  which  are  close  to  the  “research  frontier”.  More  interestingly,  one  can  ask
whether incentives for research would be missing if the state of the economy
corresponded to a very slow growth rate in the past. This question can be given a
rigorous  formulation  by  studying  the  state  of  the  economy  when  the  growth  rate g
stays constant, by deducing the limit of this state when g approaches zero, and by then
asking whether there are growth traps in which the economy is in this limiting state.
Below it will be seen that the model has also growth traps of this kind.
  Assume now that the growth rate g defined by (23) is a constant. Since the quality
parameter of an innovation whose age is t is gta e?? , the innovations for which
1gta e P?? ?
cannot be replaced by a better innovation. The maximum age 0t  for which this
condition is valid is
(24) ? ? ? ? ? ?0 ln ln lnt P g P ? ?? ?
If new innovations emerge at the constant rate ? , the number of the innovations
which are younger than this age is ? ? ? ?ln lnP ? .  However, this condition cannot be
valid if ? ? ? ?ln ln 1P ? ? , i.e. if P ?? ,  since  the  measure  of  the  sectors  of  the
economy has been normalized to 1. The interpretation of this result is that the current
model has no balanced growth paths with a positive growth rate when P ??  since in
this case the products of all sectors would end up being so close to the research
frontier that improvements to them would not exceed the required inventive factor. In
what follows, I shall assume that
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(25) P ??
  When (25) is valid and the growth rate has the constant value g, within a finite time
the number of the sectors in which there is research will obtain the constant value
? ? ? ?1 ln lnP ?? , so that the rate at which innovations happen in each of these sectors
is
? ? ? ?1 ln ln ln ln
g
P P
?
? ??? ?
The  other  sectors  are  protected  from  innovation,  but  in  both  kinds  of  sectors,  a
monopolist might loose the monopoly because her product might become non-
proprietary through imitation. The following lemma specifies the resulting
distribution of the quality parameter values.
LEMMA 1. Suppose that P ??  and that the growth rate max, max,t tg A A? ?  stays
constant after the point of time 0t ? , and denote the distributions of the relative
quality parameters of the proprietary and the non-proprietary products at time t by
? ?,Pr th a  and ? ?,N th a , respectively. For each fixed value of a there is a value of 0t
which is such that, whenever 0t t? , ? ? ? ?,Pr t Prh a h a?  and ? ? ? ?,N t Nh a h a? , where
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ?
? ?? ?
1 ln ln1
1
1 ln ,  1
1 ln ,                     1
Pg
Pr g
a aP a P
h a
a a P
??
?
?
?
??
?
? ??? ?
???
and
? ? ? ? ? ?1gN Prh a a h a??? ?
  The results of Lemma 1 can now be plugged into the definitions of the aggregators
,Pr t?  and ,N t? The definition (16) implies that the steady state values Pr?  and N?
are
(26)
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
1 1 1
0
1 11 ln ln1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1
1 1
ln ln
Pr Pr
P Pg g
P
h a a da
a aP da a da
?
?? ? ? ?
? ?
?
?? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
? ?
?
? ?
and
(27) ? ? ? ?1 1 1
0N N
h a a da??? ? ? ? ? ? ?1 1 10
1 1
ln
g
Prg
a h a a da
a
?
?
??
??? ? 0 Pr??? ? ??
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where
(28) 0??? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?1 11 ln ln1 1 1 1 1 10 1
1 1
ln ln
P P
P
a aP da a da?? ?? ?
?? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?
is the value that the aggregator Pr?  would have if 0? ? , i.e. if there was no imitation
so that all products were proprietary.
     In the current model the research firms hire a part of the labor force, and in
equilibrium their labor costs must be equal with the discounted value of their expected
profits.  Turning to the task of calculating this value, it is first observed that since in
the current model the wage tw  must be fixed by a conventional definition, the
equilibrium interest rate will depend on this convention. The result (22), which
follows from the definition of tw ,  shows that  for  a  representative  consumer  a  small
increase in the amount of money that she consumes at time t produces an identical
increase of utility at time t, and one can conclude from (4) that with our current choice
of units the interest rate on a balanced growth path has to be simply the rate of time
preference ? .
  As we saw above, the hazard rate with which a product is replaced by a better one is
0 as long as its age is smaller than the value 0t  defined by (24), and ? ?lng P?  after
that. In addition, the monopolist is threatened with losing intellectual property rights
through imitation, and this event has the constant hazard rate ? . Given that the
relative quality of a product which is invented at t will be ? ?g t ta ?? ?  at a subsequent
point of time t? , the expected profit from an innovation which is made at time t is
seen to equal
(29)
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?
0
0
0
ln
t t t t g t t
tt t
t g P t t t g t t
tt t
EV e e dt
e e dt
? ?
? ? ?
?
?
? ? ?? ? ? ? ?
?
? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
??
??
??
?
?
Here t? ?  is the profit function defined by (17). Now it can be concluded from (17) that
since on a balanced growth path the wage grows at the constant rate g,
(30) ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ?1 1g t t g t tg t tt te e ?? ?? ?? ? ? ? ??? ?? ?
Here the term ? ?? ?? ?1g t t? ?? ?  corresponds to the fact that the economic growth
lowers the quality of the product relative to the other products on the market, and the
term ? ?g t t? ?  corresponds to the fact that the economic growth makes the prices of
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all products grow. The result (30) implies that the former, negative effect is always
larger than the latter, positive effect.
 Putting the results (29) and (30) together, it follows that
(31) ? ? ? ?1ttEV M??
where
(32) ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?0 0
0
1 1 1 1 1 1 ln
0
t g t g t g P t t
t
M e dt e dt? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?
  Clearly, the multiplier M  is time independent, and if it were the case that 0g ?? ?
i.e. if there was no growth and no imitation, the value of multiplier M would be
simply 1 ? . Accordingly, a natural way to think of the function M is  to view it  as a
generalized discount factor for future profits, which takes into account not just the
time preference of consumption, but also the other effects which were listed above in
the context of (29) and (30).
  Since the number of the sectors of the economy has been normalized to 1, one can
conclude from (6) and (23) that 1L D? ? 1 ? ?? ? ? ?1 lng ? ?? ? . Together with
this result, (17) and (31) imply that the expected profit from a single innovation is
given by
(33) ? ? ? ?1 11 1 ln tt Pr N
g MEV w?
?
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ??? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?
  Since the research sector produces innovations at the rate ?  per worker, and since in
on a balanced growth path the expected profit of the research firm per worker must be
equal with its labor costs, the equilibrium condition which characterizes balanced
growth paths with a positive growth rate can be formulated as
? ?t tw EV??
This condition will now be expressed in the form
(B1) ? ?, ,F g P? ??
where 1? ?  and F is given by
(34) ? ? ? ?? ?? ?1 1
1 ln1, ,
Pr N
g M
F g P ?
? ??? ? ? ? ? ?
???
? ? ?
In this definition it is explicitly mentioned that F depends also on the parameters ?
and P,  which  describe  the  strength  of  IPR protection  and  which  also  affect M, P? ,
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and N? , since the aim of the next section will be to investigate the effects of ?  and P
on the incentives to produce innovations.
  Now  it  is  also  possible  to  give  a  more  precise  characterization  for  a  notion  of  a
growth trap which is more interesting than the one we considered in the beginning of
this section. The assumption that in a state of no growth the quality parameter
distributions correspond to very slow growth can be formulated as
(N1) If 0g ? , then Pr? ? ?0limg Pr g g? ? ??? ?   and N? ? ?0limg N g g? ? ??? ?
Clearly, when this condition is valid, a state of zero growth will be an equilibrium if
(N2) ? ?0lim , ,g F g P? ?? ? ?
  The conditions (B1) and (N2) contain the seemingly unnecessary parameter ?
(which has, by assumption, the value 1? ? ). The motive for introducing this
parameter is that it allows one to give a simple economic interpretation to the function
? ?, ,F g P? . As it was explained in Section 2, scientists may have a preference for
employment in the research sector, which is shown in a wage differential between the
research sector and other sectors of the economy. Such a preference can be modeled
by giving ?  a value which is smaller than 1 and similarly, a preference for
employment in production can be modeled by setting 1? ? .
  When ?  is interpreted as a measure of preference, each point ? ?,g ?  on the graph of
the function ? ?, ,F g P? ?? , which has been depicted in Figures 3 and 4 for two
different  parameter  values,  is  such  that  if  the  preferences  of  the  workers  were
represented by ? , the growth rate g would correspond to a balanced growth rate. The
points  at  which  the  curve  is  above  the  line 1? ?  correspond to cases in which the
workers have a preference for working in production, and the points below it
correspond to a preference for research. For this reason I shall in what follows refer to
F as the research incentive function.
As it is customary in endogenous growth theory, all the results in this paper are
concerned with the case of no preference, in which 1? ? , unless explicitly stated
otherwise. However, the more general model in which ?  is arbitrary will nevertheless
be used for giving the following characterization for the situations in which there are
multiple equilibria.
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PROPOSITION 2. Consider the generalized model in which it is not necessarily the case
that 1? ? , and let all other parameters be fixed except for ? . The model has for each
value of ?  an equilibrium which satisfies (N1) for just one value of the growth rate, if
and only if the research incentive function is decreasing in g for all values of g.
  It is fairly easy to see that F is not decreasing for all parameters and for all growth
rates, so that multiple equilibria are possible.  More specifically, one can conclude
from (34) that a change in the steady-state growth rate g has three kinds of effects on
the incentives to work in research. Firstly, larger values of g correspond to smaller
values of multiplier ? ?? ?1 lng ? ?? .  Intuitively, this means that the supply of
productive labor is smaller when the growth rate is larger, because a larger part of the
population works in a research sector, and this diminishes the profits from new
products. Secondly, (32) easily implies that
(35) 0M
g
? ?
?
i.e. that an increase of g diminishes M. Intuitively, this means that when the growth
rate is higher, the profits are lower because the danger that an inventor loses the
monopoly is larger, and because the quality of other products increases faster. Finally,
(26), (27), and (28) imply that
(36) ? ?? ? ? ?? ?1 1 1 1 1 0PrPr Ng g? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ??? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
so that an increase of g decreases the denominator in (34). Intuitively, this means that
a higher growth rate has also a positive effect for a monopolist, because when growth
is faster, a larger part of the products of competitors are proprietary, and have higher
prices.
  Figure 3 depicts a situation in which the last, positive effect is for small values of g
larger than the two negative effects, causing the model to have multiple equilibria.  In
Figure 3 there are two positive values g, 1g g?  and 2g g? , which satisfy (B1) and
which correspond to balanced growth paths of the model, and since also (N2) is valid
in the situation of the figure, the equilibria of the model include also a growth trap in
which  the  distribution  of  the  quality  parameters  corresponds  to  slow  growth  in  the
past.
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Figure 3. The research incentive function ? ?, ,F g P? ??  when 1.5? ? ,
0.5? ? , 0.005? ? , 0.95? ? , 0.1? ?  and 0 1.0499P P ?? ?? ? ? .
 Obviously, the positive effect of growth on the research incentive function does not
exist if there is no imitation (because in this case all products are proprietary,
independently of the growth rate), and it can be expected to be small also when the
imitation rate is too high (because in this case most products will be non-proprietary
even for high values of the growth rate). The following proposition confirms this
intuition by showing that multiple equilibria exist when ?  is small but positive, but
not necessarily otherwise. Here it should be kept in mind that according to Proposition
2 multiple equilibria are impossible even in the generalized model if the research
incentive function F is a decreasing function of g.
PROPOSITION 3. (a) If 0? ? , the research incentive function is decreasing in g.
(b) Suppose 0? ? . For all values of ?  which are sufficiently close to 0 (a sufficient
condition being ? ?? ?1? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ), the model has for some values of the efficiency
0 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.007
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parameter ?  multiple equilibria, one of which is a growth trap which satisfies (N1)
(i.e. a growth trap in which the quality parameter distribution corresponds to very
slow growth).
(c) If either the profit margin of the monopolists is sufficiently high (more specifically,
if ? ?1 1 1?? ?? ? ? ) or the knowledge increase parameter ?  is sufficiently low (more
specifically, if ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?1 1 1 1ln 1 1 1? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?  )  the research incentive
function will be decreasing in g for sufficiently large values of the imitation rate ? .
Figure 4. The research incentive function ? ?, ,F g P? ??  when 1.5? ? ,
5? ? , 0.5? ? , 0.95? ? , 0.1? ? , and 0 1.0499P P ?? ?? ? ? .
Proposition 3 is illustrated with Figure 4, in which both the imitation rate ?  and the
efficiency parameter ?  are larger than in Figure 3, but which corresponds to the same
parameter values otherwise. A larger imitation rate decreases the incentives for
research, implying that a larger value of ?  is needed for obtaining a positive growth
rate, and it also decreases the positive effect of growth on research incentives via the
larger market share of proprietary products. This is shown in the fact that now F is
everywhere a decreasing, and multiple equilibria are impossible.
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  It should be observed that in e.g. Figure 3 the balanced growth path which
corresponds to the smaller of the two possible positive long-run growth rates – i.e. the
one for which 1g g?  – has an implausible feature: in this equilibrium an arbitrarily
small increase in the amount of research and the corresponding increase in g would
cause a situation in which the profits of research firms per worker would be larger
than the wage in production. The situation in which 1g g?  is nevertheless an
equilibrium, because just like in most other endogenous growth models, in the current
model the contribution of each firm to the growth rate of the economy is infinitesimal.
In all actual economies the decisions of each firm have an effect on the growth rate of
the economy (however small this effect might be), and this suggests making the
following restriction on the equilibrium value of the growth rate g that one considers:
(B2) ? ?, , 0F g P g?? ?? ? ?  when g g? ? .
  Excluding the implausible case in which ? ?, ,F g P g?? ?  is  precisely  0  when
? ?, , 1F g P? ? , it is clear that the equilibrium with the largest growth rate will always
satisfy the additional condition (B2), when the model has equilibria with positive
growth rates. In the comparative static analysis of the next section I shall restrict
attention to the case in which this additional condition is valid.
5. The Growth and Welfare Effects of Intellectual Property Policy
  In the current model intellectual property policy affects growth and welfare via the
required inventive factor P and the imitation rate ? . Given that the model allows for
multiple equilibria, the function ? ?,g P?  is  now defined  to  be  the  largest  value  of g
which for the given ?  and P satisfies (B1) and (B2) if such values exists, and to be 0
otherwise. In this section I study the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing
choice of ?  and P, assuming that ? ?,g g P?? .
  In the current model there is no disutility of labor and the agents have identical
income, and it is natural to define the welfare function to be given simply by the
utility (4) of the agents. Restricting attention to balanced growth paths, I shall below
consider the normalized utility function
25
(37) max,0U U A??
The definition (4) and the result (18) easily imply that this is given by
? ?
? ?
1
0 1 1
max,0
1 t Pr N
t
Pr N
LU e u dt
A g
? ? ?
?
??
?
??
? ?? ?
? ?
? ? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ?
??
Remembering that according to (27) N? 0 Pr??? ? ?? , where the quantity 0???  is
independent of both g and ? , the welfare function U?  can be expressed in the form
(38) ? ?Pr LU G g
?
?? ? ?
?
where
(39) ? ?
? ?? ?? ?
? ?? ?
1
0
1 1
0
1
1
Pr
Pr
Pr
G
? ?
?
??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
? ? ? ?
? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ?
  In  what  follows,  I  shall  take U?  to be the welfare function that the social planner
wishes to maximize. The formula (38) shows that if the social planner adjusts P and
?  in such a way that the growth rate on the balanced growth path is increased, this
has  three  kinds  of  effects  on  the  function U? . Most obviously, this has the positive
effect of increasing welfare in the future, which is shown by the increase of the term
? ?1 g? ? . Secondly, a larger growth rate demands a larger work force in research, so
that the amount of labor which is available for production is smaller. This has the
negative effect of decreasing the term ? ?? ?1 lnL g ?? ? ?? ?  in (38). Finally, a larger
growth rate corresponds to different quality parameter distributions Pr?  and N? ,
which is shown in the change in ? ?PrG ? . This effect is characterized by the
following lemma.
LEMMA 2. For each fixed value of 0??? , the function ? ?PrG ?  receives its minimum
for some value ,0Pr?  which belongs to the interval 00, ??? ??? ? . The function ? ?PrG ?
receives its largest value in this interval both when 0Pr? ?  (i.e. when all products
are non-proprietary) and when 0Pr ??? ? ?   (i.e. when all products are proprietary),
and it is decreasing in ,00, Pr? ??? ?  and increasing in ,0 0,Pr ??? ?? ?? ? .
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  In other words, the resources for producing the different products are allocated most
efficiently when the products are either all proprietary or all non-proprietary, but in
other cases the products have price differences which cause welfare loss.
  The  growth  and  welfare  effects  of  the  rate  of  imitation ?  are characterized by the
following  proposition.  In  the  current  model  the  effects  of  imitation  on  the  research
incentive function are purely negative, since larger values of ?  correspond to a larger
danger of the loss of monopoly, and also to lower prices of competing products, and
accordingly, the growth maximizing value of ?  is 0.
PROPOSITION 4. Keeping the other parameters fixed, the growth rate ? ?,g P?  is  a
decreasing function of the rate of imitation ?  whenever ? ?,g P?  is positive, so that
the growth maximizing value of the rate of imitation is 0? ? . If the growth rate g is
below the discount rate ?  and the knowledge increase parameter ?  satisfies the
condition ln? ? ?? , this is also the welfare maximizing value of ? .
  The assumption g ??  which  is  made  in  this  proposition  must,  of  course,  be  valid
whenever an interesting welfare analysis is possible, since the utility defined by (4) is
infinite if the growth rate is larger than the discount rate. The other assumption which
appears in this proposition – i.e., ln? ? ??  – specifies a minimum for the extent to
which each innovation increases the pool of knowledge. Intuitively, this condition
means that the negative welfare effect of growth which is due to the decrease of the
labor force in production is smaller than the positive effect which is due to increased
future welfare.
  There is no similar general and simple answer to the question which value of the
required inventive factor P is  optimal.  The  following  proposition  is  concerned  with
? ?,g P?  as a function of P. It should be remembered that the assumption that 0P P? ,
where 0P
?? ??  in accordance with (20), implies that the producers of inferior, old
products are prevented from competing with the producer of  the superior, new ones,
but the producers of old products exit the market voluntarily if 0P P? .
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PROPOSITION 5. Assume that the imitation rate ?  and the other parameters of the
model except for the required inventive factor P are fixed.
(a) If ? ?,g P?  is positive when 1P ? , the value ? ?,g P?  will be increased by a
sufficiently small increase of P.
(b) If P ?? , the model does not have balanced growth paths. If balanced growth
paths with a positive growth rate exist for some value of P, the value of P which
maximizes the growth rate is smaller than ? ?2 1e ?? .
(c) In the limit P ?? ?  the derivative dg dP  approaches zero. (In other words, the
positive or negative growth effects of a further increase in P approach zero in the
limit in which P approaches its maximum.)
Figure 5. The growth rate as a function of the required inventive factor,
when 1.5? ? , 0.05? ? , 1? ? , 0.85? ? , and 0.1? ? .
This  proposition  shows that  the  growth-maximizing  choice  of P is  never  1,  but  it  is
compatible with both a situation in which the growth-maximizing value of P is
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smaller than ? , and with a situation in which growth is an increasing function of P in
the whole interval ? ?1,? . Figure 5 illustrates the former possibility. In this case
? ?2 1e ? ?? ? , and one can conclude from Proposition 4(b) that the problem choosing P
so that growth is maximized must have a well-defined solution. When this is the case,
(38) and Lemma 2 imply that the welfare-maximizing value of P will be larger or
smaller than the growth-maximizing P, depending on the sign of ? ?PrG ?  which
represents the welfare effects of the price distribution of the products. In the situation
of Figure 5 the growth-maximizing choice of P is smaller than 0P , which means that
the growth-maximizing policy would be to protect the holder of the newest patent not
just from imitation but also from competition with inferior products.
  Figure 6 represents a case in which ? ?2 1e ? ?? ? .  In  this  case  Proposition  4  does  not
imply that there was a growth-maximizing value of P. No such value exists in the
situation of Figure 6, since in it growth is increased by an increase in P in the whole
interval ? ?1,? , but the model fails to have an equilibrium if P ?? .
  Intuitively, an increase of P has a positive effect on the research incentive function
because it increases future profits by lengthening the time during which the
innovation is protected from being replaced by a superior product, and a negative
effect because it increases the average current quality of the products of competitors,
by shifting research efforts to the worst products on the market. Since the former
effect  is  small  in  an  economy  with  few  innovations,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  small
values of P, which correspond to excluding the inferior products of the same sector
from the market when a new product emerges, would be optimal in an economy with
a small growth rate.
  I shall conclude this section with a proposition which shows that this is, indeed, the
case. The proposition is concerned with the effects of the lowering of the efficiency
parameter ? . A decrease in ?  shifts the research incentive function F downwards
and decreases ? ?,g P? , and as Figures 3 and 4 illustrate, such a shift will make
? ?,g P?  decrease to zero continuously when F is decreasing in g (as in Figure 4) but
not necessarily otherwise (e.g. not in the situation of Figure 3). We wish to consider
the limit in which the growth rate is small but positive, and for this reason the
following proposition contains the restrictive assumption that F is decreasing in g.
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Figure 6. The growth rate as a function of the required inventive factor,
when 1.2? ? , 0.05? ? , 3? ? , 0.85? ? , and 0.1? ? .
PROPOSITION 6. Assume that the imitation rate ?  and the parameters ?  and ?  are
fixed. Define 0?  by ? ?? ?? ?0 inf , 0 for someg P P? ?? ? ? ???? ?  (i.e., let 0?  be the
threshold value of the efficiency parameter ?  below which the growth rate will be
zero, independently of how the required inventive factor P is chosen). If the research
incentive function F is decreasing in g for all P, the growth-maximizing value of the
required inventive factor P approaches 1 when 0? ?? ? . If the welfare maximizing
value of P corresponds to a positive growth rate when 0? ?? ? , also this value
approaches 1 when 0? ?? ? .
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6. Concluding Remarks
  Above I have studied the generalization of a “pool of knowledge” growth model to a
situation of imperfect intellectual property rights. Unlike the models of growth
through specialization, the framework which was developed above allows for a
discussion of the required inventive step of patents, and it does not contain the
implausible assumption made in quality ladder growth models, according to which the
demand of each good would be independent of its quality.
  It turned out that the model provided conceptual tools for understanding growth
traps, i.e. situations in which there is no economic growth although a state of positive
growth would be possible for identical parameter values. In the current model growth
traps were caused by the fact that in an economy which has grown slowly in the past
most products are non-proprietary and cheaper than in a quickly-growing economy
with many proprietary products, and this lowers the profits of a research firm which
has a monopoly to a new product.
  The analysis of comparative statics revealed that the optimal value of the required
inventive step is always positive, although it might be small in a slowly-growing
economy. It also turned out that growth is always increased by a decrease of imitation,
so that the growth-maximizing imitation rate was zero.
  However, it should be observed that this result was deduced assuming that the extent
to which the available “pool of knowledge” can be utilized for making new
innovations is independent of whether the available products are proprietary.
However, in the intended application of the model the “proprietary” products might be
protected not just by patents but also by e.g. trade secrets, and in this case it is
plausible to assume that the available pool of knowledge can be utilized more
efficiently when there are more non-proprietary products on the market. It is clear that
the growth-maximizing imitation rate might be positive in a generalized model in
which this effect is taken into account.
  There are several other ways in which one might wish to generalize the current
model. As it was pointed out in the introduction, patent literature distinguishes
between patent length, the patentability requirement, and the lagging and the leading
breadth of a patent. As a natural next step, one might wish to generalize the current
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framework in such a way that it allowed for a discussion of patent breadth and patent
length, which were not considered above explicitly.
  However, it seems that a “pool of knowledge” growth model does not – at least not
without dramatic modifications of the whole framework – allow for an interesting
discussion of the distinction between the breadth of a patent and the patentability
requirement. If one assumed that patents have a leading breadth K which is larger than
the patentability requirement P, this would in the current model have precisely the
same consequences as the assumption that the patentability requirement was K: since
in the model all new products are of the quality which corresponds to the research
frontier, there would in both cases be research in only those sectors whose distance
from the research frontier was larger than K.
  On the other hand, it would be fairly easy to include patents of a finite duration into
the current framework, since in it the size of an innovation exceeds the patentability
requirement P if and only if it replaces a product whose age is larger than a constant
0t . Hence, many features of the current model would remain unchanged if one
replaced the patentability requirement P with a minimum age 0t  which a product must
exceed before it can be replaced by a new one. However, in a model with this
interpretation it would be natural to assume that all products become non-proprietary
when they reach the age 0t , which would change the results of the above analysis.
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APPENDIX 1. PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. Part (a) follows trivially from the fact that if max 1iA A P?
in all sectors i of the economy, it is not possible to make any innovations whose size
would exceed the required inventive factor. Assume now that 1P ? , that 0g ? , and
that also ,P t? ? ? ? ? ? ?1 1 1,0 Pr th a a da
?? ?? ?? ? 0? . Clearly, the aggregator
? ? ? ? ? ?1 1 1, ,0N t N th a a da
?? ?? ?? ? ?  can now have an arbitrary constant value between 0 and
1. Further, the labor supply must be 1L ? ,  so  that  the  profit  from a  monopoly  to  a
new product is according to (17) in this case given by
? ? ? ? ? ?11 1
,, ,
1 1 1 11t
N tPr t N t
w w? ??
? ?? ? ?? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?
Still assuming that 0g ? , the expected profit from an innovation is
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?1
0
,
1
1 tt
N t
wEV e dt
? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ?
?
? ? ? ?? ? ? ??
Working in production is preferable to research as long as ? ? ttEV w? ? . This is
equivalent with
? ? ? ?1
,
1
1
N t
? ?? ??
? ?
? ? ?? ?
Since the aggregator ,N t?  can have any value for which ,0 1N t? ? ? , a state of zero
growth is possible whenever
? ? ? ?1 1 1? ?? ? ?? ?
? ? ?
? .?
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. Define 0 max,0A A? , and let ,PrH ?  and ,NH ?  be  the  density
functions that the A parameter values have at time ?  within the sets of proprietary and
of nonproprietary innovations, respectively.  Let a be arbitrary, and define 0t  by
? ?0 ln 1t a g? . Further, let 0t t?  be arbitrary,  and put 0u t t? ?  so that
(A1) ? ?0 g t ugta e e? ??? ?
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is, intuitively, the relative quality that a product which has been invented at time u has
at time t.
  It is clear that during a short time interval ? ?,u u t??  an innovation happens in the
part ? ?t? ?  of  the  sectors.  Since  at  the  same  time  the  value  of maxA  grows with
? ? ? ?max,ln uA t? ? ? , the value ? ?, max,Pr u uH A  is seen to equal
(A2) ? ? ? ? ? ?, max, max, max,
1
ln lnPr u u u u
tH A
A t A
?
? ? ?
?? ??
When t u? , the value of ? ?, max,Pr t uH A  diminishes because the products turn
nonproprietary at the rate ? , and because of the emergence of new innovations. If an
innovation has been made at the moment u, the moment of time at which it becomes
legitimate to make a new innovation in its sector is
(A3) t? lnu P g? ? ? ?ln lnu P ? ?? ?
The hazard rate of a new innovation in each of the sectors in which innovating is
legitimate is ? ?ln lng P? ? . Hence,
(A4) ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ?
, max,
, max, ln ln ln
, max,
,                                  ln
,    ln
t u
Pr u u
Pr t u t u g P t u P g
Pr u u
e H A t u P g
H A
e H A t u P g
?
? ?
? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ??? ?
? ???
and
(A5) ? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?, max, , max,1
t u
N t u Pr t ut u
eH A H A
e
?
?
? ?
? ?
??
Combining (A3) and (A4), it now follows that
(A6) ? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ?
max,
, max,
ln ln ln ln ln
max,
1 ,     ln
ln
1 ,   ln
ln
t u
u
Pr t u
t u g P t u P P
u
e g t u P
A
H A
e g t u P
A
?
? ? ?
?
?
? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ???? ?
? ? ???
Clearly, (A1) implies that the condition ? ? lng t u P? ?  is  equivalent  with 1a P? ,
and further that
(A7) ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ?
? ?? ?
1 ln ln1
, max, , max, 1
1 ln ,  1
1 ln ,                      1
Pg
Pr t t Pr t t g
a aP a P
h a A H aA
a a P
??
?
?
?
??
?
? ??? ? ?
???
Similarly,
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(A8)
? ? ? ?
? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ?
, max, , max, max, , max, ,
1 ln ln
1 1
1 ln 1 ,  1
1 ln 1 ,                     1
t u g
N t t N t t t Pr t t Pr tgt u
Pg
g
e ah a A H aA A H aA h a
ae
a a aP a P
a a a P
? ?
??
??
?
?
?
? ?
? ?
?
? ?? ? ?
? ? ??? ?
? ???
This completes the proof. ?
PROOF  OF PROPOSITION 2. Defining ? ?0, ,F P?  to be given by
? ? ? ?00, , lim , ,gF P F g P? ?? ??
it is seen that an equilibrium satisfies (N1) if and only if the research incentive
function expresses the wage in the research sector in it. (This is, of course, trivial if
0g ? ). However, ? ?0lim , , 0g F g P?? ? ?  and ? ? ? ?lnlim , , 0g F g P? ? ?? ? ? , so that there
will be no values of ?  for which two possible values of the growth rate g (i.e. values
for which 0 lng ? ?? ? )   satisfy  the  equilibrium  condition  (B1)  if  and  only  if F is
decreasing for all values of g. ?
PROOF  OF PROPOSITION 3. Combining (27) and (34), the function F can be expressed
in the form
(A9) ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?
1
1 1
0
1 ln
, , 1
1 Pr
g M
F g P ? ? ?
?
? ?? ? ? ?
?
?
?
?
?
? ?
? ? ? ?
It immediately follows from (26) and (28) that
(A10) If 0? ? , then Pr? 0??? ?
According to (28), 0???  is independent of g, and according to (35), 0M g? ? ? .
Together with (A10), these results imply that when 0? ?
1 1 0
ln
F M
F g g g? ?
? ? ?? ? ?
? ? ?
This proves the validity of (a).
  Turning to (b), it is now assumed that 0? ? . First, it is observed that if it for some
value of ?  it is the case that ? ?0, , 1F P? ?  and ? ?? ? 0, , 0gF g P g? ?? ? ? , then the
model must have an equilibrium for some positive value 2g  of g, since
? ? ? ?lnlim , , 0g F g P? ? ?? ? ? .  Further, keeping ?  and P fixed, the function ? ?, ,F g P?
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is continuous function of g and ?  and a decreasing function of ? . This implies that if
the value of ?  is given a sufficiently small decrease ?? , there will still be a positive
value 2g g?  which corresponds to an equilibrium, but now 0g ?  is  a  growth  trap
satisfying both (N1) and (N2). Accordingly, we now consider the condition which
must be valid if ?  can be chosen so that ? ?0, , 1F P? ?  and ? ?? ? 0, , 0gF g P g? ?? ? ? .
  First, the function I is defined by
(A11) ? ? ? ?0 0
0
0 0
, ,
t Qt R t tQt
t
I Q R t e dt e dt
? ? ? ??? ?? ?
Clearly, when one puts
(A12) ? ?ln lnR g P?? ?
and
(A13) ? ?0 lnt P g?
it turns out that
(A14) ? ? ? ?3 0, ,M g I Q R t?
where ? ? ? ?3 1Q g? ? ? ?? ? ? ? .  Further,  when  one  makes  the  change  of  variables
gta e?? , ? ?gtda ge dt?? ? , it turns out that
(A15) P? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ?0 0
0
1 1 ln ln
0ln
t g t g t g P t t
t
g e dt e dt? ? ? ? ??
?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?2 0, ,ln
g I Q R t??
where ? ?2 1Q g? ?? ? ? . In particular, since 0??? ? ? 0P ??? ? , it follows that
(A16) ? ?0 1 0, ,ln
g I Q R t? ??? ?
where ? ?1 1Q g ?? ? .
  The definition (A11) easily implies that
(A17) ? ? ? ?
0
0
1, ,
QtReI Q R t
Q Q Q R
?
? ? ?
In particular, when this result is applied to (A16), a straightforward computation
shows that
(A18) 0???
? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
1 11 1
1
ln 1 ln
P
P
?? ?
? ? ?
? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?
Clearly, (A9) implies that
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(A19)
? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?
? ?? ?
? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?
? ?
3 0
3 0
1 1
2 0
2 01 1
0
, , , ,1 1
, , ln , ,
1 , ,
   , ,
ln 1 Pr
F g P g I Q R t
F g P g I Q R t g
I Q R t
I Q R t g
g
?
?
?
?
? ? ?
?
? ?
?
?
?
? ? ??? ?? ?
? ?? ?? ?? ??? ? ? ? ? ?
Consider now this expression in the limit in which 0g ? . According to (A12), 0R ?
when 0g ? , and hence it must be the case both when 2Q Q?  and when 3Q Q?   that
 (A20) ? ?0 0lim , , 1g I Q R t Q? ?
The analysis of the limits ? ?0 0lim , ,g I Q R t g? ? ?  is complicated by the fact that when
1P ? , ? ? ? ?00 0lim lim 0Qt Q gg ge P? ?? ?? ? , but if 1P ? , it turns out that
? ? ? ?00 0lim lim 1 1Qtg ge?? ?? ? . Considering each case separately, a straightforward
calculation shows that
 (A21) ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
2
0 0 2
1 ,   1
lim , ,
1 ,      1
g
Q Q R g P
I Q R t g
Q Q g P
?
? ? ? ? ? ??? ? ? ?
? ? ? ???
Now ?  is defined by
(A22)
? ? ? ?
? ?
3
3
1 1 ln ,   1,   1
1 ,     1,      1
PQ R g P
PQ g P
? ? ?
?
? ?
? ? ???? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ? ?? ?
Clearly, (A15) implies that 0P? ?  when ?  is positive but 0g ? . Plugging this
result, (A20), and (A21) into (A19) yields
? ?
? ?
? ?? ?
? ?
1 1
3 0 20
1, , 1 1 1
, , ln ln
g
F g P g
F g P Q Q
?
?
?? ?? ? ? ?
?
??
?? ?? ? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ?
Together with the definitions ? ?2 1Q g? ?? ? ?  and ? ? ? ?3 1Q g? ? ? ?? ? ? ? , this
implies that
(A23) ? ?? ?
? ?? ?
? ?
1 1
00
1, , 1
, , ln ln
g
F g P g
F g P
?
?
?? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?
??
?? ?? ? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?
As  it  was  explained  above,  we  wish  to  find  out  under  which  circumstances  this
derivative is positive when ? ?0, , 1F P? ? . Clearly, (A9) easily implies that the latter
condition is equivalent with
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(A24) ? ?
? ?
? ?
1
0
1
1
? ?
?
? ?? ? ?
?
?
? ?? ?
When ?  is chosen so that this condition is valid, the expression (A23) will be positive
if and only if
(A25) ? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?
? ?
1 1 1
01 1 0
ln ln
? ? ?
??? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
??? ? ?? ? ?? ?
However, since (A18) implies that ? ?0 1 ln? ? ??? ? ? ,  one  can  conclude  that  when
1P ? ,
(A26) 0
1
ln?
? ??? ?
On the other hand, when 1,P ? (A18) and (A22) imply that
1 1
1 ln 1 ln
? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ??? ?? ? ?? ?
1 1 ln 1
ln 1 ln ln
? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?
so that (A26) is valid also in this case. Hence, the result (A25) must be valid
whenever
? ? ? ? ? ?1 1 11 1 1 0
? ? ?? ? ?
? ? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ?? ? ?? ?
This is equivalent with ? ?? ?1? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? , and it can be concluded that the model
has two equilibria for some values of ?  when this condition is valid, as it is stated in
part (b) of this proposition.
  Finally, turning to the part (c) in this proposition, it is concluded from (A19) that if
the quantity ?  which is given by
(A27)
? ?
? ?
? ?? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
3 0
3 0
1 1
2 0 2 0
, ,1
, ,
1
, , , ,
ln
I Q R t
I Q R t g
I Q R t g I Q R t
g
??
?
?
?? ? ?
? ? ??? ?? ?? ?? ?
is negative for some values of g, P, and ?  then for these values 0F g? ? ? ,
independently of how ?  is chosen. In what follows ?  is viewed as a function of g,
and the behavior of this function is studied for large values of ? . For this reason it is
first concluded from (A15) that
(A28) lim 0P??? ? ?
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Clearly, (A17) implies both when ? ?2 1Q Q g? ?? ? ? ?  and when
? ? ? ?3 1Q Q g? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?  that
(A29) ? ?? ?0lim , , 1I Q R t? ??? ?
Further, (A17) and a straightforward calculation shows that
(A30) ? ? ? ?? ?? ?
2 02
1 1 1 ln ,    1, ,
lim
1 1 ,        1
PI Q R t
g P
?
? ?
?
???
?? ? ? ??? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ? ?
and that
(A31) ? ? ? ?? ?? ?
3 02
1 1 ln ,    1, ,
lim
1 ,        1
PI Q R t
g P
?
? ? ?
?
? ???
?? ? ? ??? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ? ?
  When the results (A28)-(A31) are inserted into (A27), it turns out that for each value
of g
(A32) ? ?
? ?? ?
? ?
1 1
0
1
lim
1 ln
?
?
?
??? ? ?
?
??
?
??? ? ?? ?
Next it is concluded from (A18) that
(A33)
? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
2 ln 1
0
2 ln 1
1
ln 1 ln ln
1 1 1   0
ln 1 1 ln 1 ln
P
P
e
P P P
e
P P P
?
?
?
?
? ? ?
?
? ? ? ? ? ?
? ?
?
? ?
? ??? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?
The possible values of P range from 1 to ?  and it can now be concluded from (A18)
that within this range
? ?0 1P?? ?? 0??? ? ? ?0 P? ?? ?? ?
i.e. that
(A34) ? ?? ?? ?1 101 1 11 ln ln ??? ? ?? ? ? ? ??? ?? ? ? ?? ?
Now (A32) implies that the limit of ? ?  satisfies the condition
(A35) ? ?
? ?? ?
? ?
? ?? ?? ?1 1 1 1
0
1 1 1 ln1lim
1 ln 1 ln
? ?
?
?
? ? ? ??? ?? ? ? ?
? ?
??
?
? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ?
Clearly, this is negative if and only if
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? ?? ?? ? ? ?1 1 1 11 1 ln 1
ln
?
?? ? ? ? ??
?
?? ? ? ? ? ?
Obviously, this is valid if either the right-hand side is negative (i.e. ? ?1 1 1?? ? ?? ? ) or
ln ?  is smaller than the limit specified in this proposition,
? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?1 1 1 11 1 1? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? . When either of these conditions is valid, ? ?
converges  to  a  negative  limit,  which  implies  that  when ?  is sufficiently large, ?
and accordingly also F g? ?  are negative for all legitimate values of ? , P and g. This
completes the proof of the proposition. ?
PROOF  OF LEMMA 2. The definition (39) implies that
(A36) ? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ?? ?
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0
1
1 1
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1 1 1 1
1
Pr
Pr
Pr
G
? ? ? ? ? ?
?
??
?
? ? ? ? ? ?
?
? ? ? ? ?
?
??
?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ?
? ? ? ?
Clearly, there is just one value of Pr?  for which ? ? 0PrG? ? ? , and this is the value
Pr? ,0Pr? ?  which is given by
(A37) ,0Pr? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?
1 1 1 1
01 1 1
1
1 1 1
? ? ?
?? ? ?
? ? ?
? ? ?
? ? ?
?? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ?
The result (A36) also implies that ? ? 0PrG? ? ?  when ,0P Pr? ? ?  and ? ? 0PrG? ? ?
when ,0P Pr? ? ? ,  so  that  the  extreme  value  at Pr? ,0Pr? ?  is  a  minimum.  We  are
considering a case in which the values of Pr?  have been restricted to the interval
00, ??? ??? ? , and it is now observed that
(A38) ? ? ? ? 10 00G G ?? ??? ?? ? ? ?
Together with the result concerning ? ?PrG? ? , this implies that ,00 Pr Pr? ? ? ?  so that
G decreases in the interval ,00, Pr? ??? ?  and increases in the interval ,0 0,Pr ??? ?? ?? ? . ?
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. The definitions (26) and (32) immediately imply that
0Pr ??? ? ? and that ? ? 0M g ?? ? ? . On the other hand, 0???  is, obviously,
independent of ? , as also the result (A18) shows. Hence, one can conclude from (A9)
that
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(A39) ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ?
1 1
1 1
0
, , 1 1 , , 0
1
Pr
Pr
F g P M g
F g P
M g
?
?
?
? ? ?? ? ??
?
?
?
? ?? ? ? ??? ?? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?
By definition, for any given values of ?  and P the value ? ?,g P?  satisfies the
condition ? ?? ?, , , 1F g P P? ? ?  so that
(A40) 0F dg F
g d? ?
? ?? ?
? ?
and
(A41) ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
Fdg
d F g
?
?
? ?? ? ? ?
Since by definition ? ?,g P?  corresponds to an equilibrium for which ? ?, 0F P g?? ? ?
if ? ?,g P?  is positive, (A39) and (A41) together imply that
0dg
d? ?
so that the growth maximizing value of the rate of imitation is 0? ? . Turning to the
claim concerning welfare, consider now the term ? ?L g? ? ?  which appears in the
welfare function U?  defined by (38).
Clearly,
? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?
? ?? ? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ?
? ?? ? ? ?
1 2
1 2
1 ln 1 ln ln
1 ln
1 1 ln 1
1 ln
g g gd L d
dg g dg g g g
g
g g
??
?
?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ??
? ? ?
?
?
? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ? ??
? ?
Together with the assumptions g ??  and ln? ? ?? , this implies that
(A42)
? ?? ?
? ?? ? ? ?1 2
1 1 ln
0
1 ln
d L
dg g g g
?
?
? ? ?
? ? ? ??
?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ?
.
This implies that the term ? ?L g? ? ?  receives its maximal value when 0? ? , since
the growth rate is  largest  in this case.  On the other hand, Lemma 2 states that  when
0? ? , also the function ? ?PrG ?  receives its maximal value 1 0????? , which is
independent of g.  Putting these results together, it follows that the choice of ?  which
maximizes the welfare function ? ? ? ?PrU G L g? ?? ?? ? ?? ??  is 0? ? . ?
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 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. The equilibrium condition ? ?? ?, , , 1F g P P? ? ?   implies that
0F dg F
g dP P
? ?? ?
? ?
This is equivalent with
(A43) ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
F Pdg
dP F g
? ?? ? ? ?
so that dg dP  has the same sign with dF dP  when (B2) is valid.
  Using the notation described in (A11)-(A16),  it can be concluded from (A9) that
(A44)
? ?
? ?
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? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
1 1
1 0 2 03 0
1 1
3 0 1 0 2 0
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Remembering that the values ? ?1 1Q g ?? ? , ? ?2 1Q g? ?? ? ? , and
? ? ? ?3 1Q g? ? ? ?? ? ? ?  are independent of P, the function J will now be defined as
(A45) ? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ?? ?
? ?
0
0 0
, ln , ln, ,
,
, , , ,
I Q g g P P g PI Q R t P
J Q P
I Q R t I Q R t
? ?? ?? ?
The following result will be made use of below:
(A46)  If ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?1 2 3, min , , ,J Q P J Q P J Q P? , then ? ?, , 0F g PP
?? ?? .
In order to prove this result, it is first observed that since the denominator
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?1 11 0 2 0, , 1 , ,I Q R t I Q R t?? ?? ?   is always positive, the condition
? ? ? ?1 2, ,J Q P J Q P? implies that
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ?
? ?
1 1
1 0 2 0 1 0
1 1
1 01 0 2 0
, , 1 , , , ,
, ,, , 1 , ,
I Q R t P I Q R t P I Q R t P
I Q R tI Q R t I Q R t
?
?
?
?
?
?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??
? ?
In a second step, it is then noted that this result, (A45), and the assumption that
? ? ? ?1 3, ,J Q P J Q P?  together imply that
? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?3 3 1 3, ,1 , , 0, ,
F g P
J Q P J Q P
F g P P
?
?
? ? ? ??
By modifying this proof in an obvious way, one can also prove the following result:
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(A47)  If ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?1 2 3, max , , ,J Q P J Q P J Q P? , then ? ?, , 0F g PP
?? ?? .
  Since each value of Q is independent of P, (A17) implies that
(A48) ? ?0, ,I Q R t
P
?
? ? ?
0QtRe
P Q Q R
?? ??? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?
? ?ln
ln ln
Q P gg e
P Q Q P g?
?? ??? ? ? ?? ?? ? ?? ?
? ?? ? ? ?? ?
? ?ln
ln ln ln ln
Q P gg Q Q e
gPQ Q P g P Q P g? ?
?? ?? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
0
2
QtRQe
gP Q R
?
?
?
Hence, (A17) implies also that
(A49) ? ? ? ?
? ?
? ?? ?
0
0
2
0
0
, ,1,
, ,
Qt
Qt
I Q R t RQ eJ Q P
I Q R t P gP Q R Q R Re
?
?
?? ?? ? ? ?
  In order to prove (a), assume that 1P ? .  In  this  case lnR g ??  and
? ?0 ln 0t P g? ? , and (A49) implies that
? ? ? ?, ln
RQ QJ Q P
g Q R Q g?? ?? ?
Since this is an increasing function of Q and ? ?1 2 3min ,Q Q Q? , it now follows that
? ? ? ? ? ?? ?1 2 3, min , , ,J Q P J Q P J Q P?  and one can conclude from (A46) and (A43)
that if 1P ? ,
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? 0
F Pdg
dP F g
? ?? ? ?? ?
This completes the proof of (a).
  It was demonstrated in Section 4 above that the result (25) – i.e., P ??  – is valid on
any balanced growth path of the model. Turning to the other claim which was made in
part (b), it is concluded from (A49) that
? ? ? ?0
0
0
0
, 12 1 ,
Qt
Qt
J Q P Rt et J Q P
Q Q Q R Q R Re
?
?
? ? ??? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?
We are interested in comparing the values ? ?1,J Q P , ? ?2 ,J Q P , and ? ?3 ,J Q P . It is
clear that ? ?1 2 3min ,Q Q Q?  and that when 1Q Q? ? ?1g ?? ? ,
? ? ? ?0
1
, 2 ,
J Q P
t J Q P
Q Q
? ? ?? ?? ?? ? ?
? ?? ? ? ?,2 1 ln J Q PP
g
?? ? ?
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Hence, ? ?, 0J Q P Q? ? ?  for all 1Q Q?  at  least  when ? ?2 1 ln 0P?? ? ? , i.e. when
? ?2 1P e ??? . In this case it must be the case that ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?1 2 3, max , , ,J Q P J Q P J Q P?
and one can conclude from (A47) and (A43) that
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? 0
F Pdg
dP F g
? ?? ? ?? ?
This proves (b).
  Finally, consider the limit in which P ?? , so that ? ?ln lnR g P?? ? ?? . The
results (A48) implies that in this limit
? ? ? ?ln0, ,lim 0Q P gP I Q R t g Q Q eP Qg Pg gP?
?
? ?
? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ?
so that one can conclude from (A44) that
(A50) ? ?
? ?, ,1lim 0
, ,P
F g P
F g P P?
?
?? ?
? ?? ?? ?? ??? ?
This proves (c). ?
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6. Assume that 1P ? . The definitions (32), (26), and (28)
imply that ? ? ? ?0 1M ? ?? ?  and that
(A51) ? ? 0Pr g?? 0limg Pr?? ? 0
,    0
0,          0
? ?
?
?? ??? ? ??
When these results are inserted into (A9), it is seen that
(A52) ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?
? ?
0
1
0
1 ,       0
0, ,
1
,       0
F P
?
? ?
?
?? ?? ? ?
?
? ? ? ?? ?
?
?
?
?? ?? ? ??? ? ?? ?? ? ??
However, according to the result (A33), which was demonstrated within the proof of
Proposition  2, 0 0P???? ? ? , and one can conclude from (A51) that
(A53) ? ?0, , 0F P
P
?? ??
Hence, since F is by assumption of decreasing function of g,
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? ?? ?? ?
? ?? ?
? ?? ?
0 inf , 0 for some
inf 0, , 1 for some , when
inf 0, ,1 1, given
g P P
F P P
F
? ?? ? ?
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ?
??
?? ?
? ?? ? ?
? ?? ? ?
Let 1P? ?  be arbitrary. Since ? ? ? ?0, , 0, ,1F P F? ?? ?  for each ?  and ? ?0, ,F P?  is a
continuous and increasing function of ? ,  it  must  be  the  case  for  all  values 0? ?? ?
which are sufficiently close to 0?  that
? ?? ? ? ?? ?
0
0, , 0, ,1 1F P F? ? ? ?? ??? ?? ? ?
In other words, when ??  is sufficiently close to 0?  there will be no growth if P P?? ,
so that the growth-maximizing value of P must in this case be smaller than P? . Since
1P? ?  was arbitrary, it follows that the growth-maximizing value of P approaches 1
when 0? ?? ? . Similarly, also the welfare-maximizing value of P must approach 1
if it is a value for which the growth rate is positive. ?
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